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CODA
Paul J. Griffiths

In "Blindingly Obvious Christian Anti-Semitism" Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann further defend their claim that Christianity is not responsible
for antisemitism by drawing a sharp distinction between a doctrinal account
of Christianity and (what they call) a sociological one. I argue in response
that the distinction they make between these two kinds of account cannot, on
pain of incoherence, be drawn as sharply as they wish; that in making it they
have misread my argument about the kinds of connection that obtain between
Christianity and antisemitism in two important ways; and that there are good
Christian doctrinal reasons for expecting that any culturally significant body
of belief-including Christian doctrine itself-will be implicated with moral
(as well as other kinds of) failure, and that it therefore ought not to be
surprising to find a case in point.
I am grateful to Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann for their lucid and
forceful reply to my discussion of their critique of Gordon Kaufman.1 It's
now clear that Stump and Kretzmann agree with most of what I claimed in
my earlier piece, but that they persist in thinking it unimportant. So on what,
exactly, do we differ? Principally, I think, on two questions. First, what should
the lexical item "Christianity" be taken to denote? And second, what kinds
of data are relevant to decisions about this? For them "Christianity" denotes
nothing other than a set of doctrines,2 and they seem to have well-developed
intuitions as to just which doctrines belong to this set. Unfortunately they
share with their readers neither the procedures they deploy to decide which
doctrines belong to the set, nor a list of the set's members. It remains unclear
exactly how, for them, genuine members of the set are recognized and pretenders rejected.
On the second question, though, a negative point is clear: for Stump and
Kretzmann no "sociological" data can be permitted to count, procedurally, in
determining which doctrines belong to the set denoted by "Christianity."3
Historical information as to which doctrines Christians have taken to belong
to the set assent to which they have taken to be required by their identity as
Christians, and what they have taken to follow, behaviorally, from such assent, has, apparently, no bearing whatever for Stump and Kretzmann on
proper decisions as to what "Christianity" denotes. This is an exceedingly
odd position. How, if information of this sort is irrelevant to arriving at a
definition of "Christianity," can the text of the New Testament be used? The
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texts of the credal statements of the ecumenical councils? The text (I speak
here as an Episcopalian Christian) of the Book of Common Prayer? What are
all these things if not "sociological" data? (They may of course be other
things as well-such as the word of God, as I take the New Testament to
be-but I don't suppose that even Kretzmann and Stump will deny that they
are at least "sociological" data.) Information about them can surely not be
irrelevant to deciding what the term "Christianity" denotes, and yet Stump
and Kretzmann seem committed to wanting it to be, since they claim, in the
specific case of antisemitic beliefs, that the facts that Christians have held
such beliefs, and that they have taken themselves to hold them as properly
Christian beliefs, have no relevance whatever to decisions as to whether such
beliefs really are Christian.
I note here, as relevant to this central point, a couple of exegetical problems
in Stump and Kretzmann's reading of my piece. I neither claimed nor suggested that "Christian ideas" should be taken exclusively in a sociological
sense to mean ideas sometimes held by people who considered themselves
Christians. In the case of the antisemitic ideas under discussion I suggested,
and would still suggest, that these were (and are) not just ideas held by
Christians, nor just ideas associated with Christianity by non-Christians, but
rather ideas taken by Christians to be a proper part of their Christian identity,
to be properly Christian ideas. That Stump and Kretzmann elide this part of
my claim throughout is not accidental. If they were clear about it they would
be forced to say things much closer to the absurdities mentioned in the
immediately preceding paragraph. I also did not claim that religions should
be defined only "sociologically," though for reasons already suggested I take
"sociological" data to be unavoidably relevant in arriving at any such definitions.
It's also important to reject the idea that I think that Christianity is singlehandedly responsible for the Holocaust. I'm not quite clear as to whether
Stump and Kretzmann think I think this or not; earlier versions of their
response (the version printed with this piece is the third revision that I've
seen) strongly suggested that they did, but this final version isn't so clear.
Anyhow, I explicitly denied holding any such view in my earlier piece,
asserting only that there are interesting causal connections between how
Christians have historically understood themselves and their relations to Jews
and the occurrence of the Holocaust, connections that are likely as strong as
that the former is among the necessary conditions for the occurrence of the
latter. Much the same might be said (I lack the historical expertise to know)
about the relations between Marxist self-understandings and the Gulag or
about Islamic ones and the attempted extermination of the Kurds. And I would
certainly want to affirm in this connection, as a matter of principle (and for
good Christian doctrinal reasons) something that my interlocutors apparently
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find surprising: that no culturally significant body of belief will be above
serious moral approach. The doctrine of original sin, properly understood (I
would argue, though I haven't space to here), suggests that this ought to be
true; and my own limited historical expertise reveals no counterexamples.
But this claim doesn't at all mean that it's uninteresting or irrelevant to
consider which bodies of belief seem to those who hold them to comport well
with-or even require-which moral unpleasantnesses. My claim, once
again, is that those who have considered themselves Christians have often
thought (and often still think) that their Christianity comports well with-and
even requires-the moral evil of antisemitism (though not, of course, usually
under just that description).
But let's be charitable. Since Stump and Kretzmann can't, I hope, mean
what they apparently intend about the irrelevance of "sociological" information to a proper definition of Christianity, let's assume they mean just this:
that there are many bodies of belief which neither entail nor make plausible
antisemitism; that one of these is what "Christianity" denotes; and that this
same one is what they themselves assent to under that label. The first of these
three claims is obviously true. The second can easily be made stipulatively
true, though doing so without argument and without seriously engaging the
question of how the proposed set relates to what Christians have historically
taken to be Christian beliefs, sounds very like Humpty Dumpty. And I assume
that the third is true, since Stump and Kretzmann themselves must be the
most authoritative witnesses to its truth, and they assert it. My claim was (and
remains) that there is a very great deal of historical evidence to support the
claim that many Christians have taken themselves to have properly Christian
beliefs that do issue in antisemitic behavior. I now add to it the view that
historical evidence as to what Christians have thought were properly Christian beliefs is not irrelevant to decisions about what actually are such. If the
second of these claims is right-and I don't think that Stump and Kretzmann
can easily defend its contradictory-then it follows that account must be
taken of what Christians have thought were properly Christian beliefs about
Jews in deciding what actually are such. A refusal to do this on principle, I
still say, is historically blind; it may also be incoherent if it is thematized as
a procedural rule, as Stump and Kretzmann have now done.
Finally: it does not follow from anything I've said here (or in my previous
piece) that being a Christian entails being an antisemite. I, like Stump and
Kretzmann, am the former and try not to be the latter. 4 Perhaps also like them,
I think there are ritual practices and beliefs that contribute to my Christian
identity that can reasonably be taken to call antisemitism into question or to
be incompatible with it. The same might be said about Martin Luther: perhaps
some of his doctrinal commitments ought to have caused him to think more
than twice about being the antisemite he appears to have been. But sorting
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out whether and in what sense this is true would be hard historical and
conceptual work, not a matter to be dismissed with the cavalier tone adopted
by Stump and Kretzmann. And this, to return to the original context, is what
I took to be the point of the disagreement between them and Kaufman: he
thinks that the iron of antisemitism (and some other sins) has entered deeply
into the mind and soul of Christians for reasons that have to do with their
Christian identity, and that acknowledging this and taking seriously the importance of knowing something of its etiology is a necessary part of the
remedy. They think, it seems, that the matter is simple and that a remedy can
be arrived at without such knowledge. But the matter is not simple and any
attempt to deal with it in a purely a priori manner will fail, both ethically
and, in the end, conceptually.

University of Chicago
NOTES
Thanks to Del Kiernan-Lewis, Joseph Wawrykow, Phil Devenish, Peter Losin, and
Judith Heyhoe.
1. All these pieces have appeared in this journal. Kaufman's original in vol. 6 (1989),
35-46; Stump & Kretzmann's response in vol. 7 (1990), 329-339; my first response in
vol. 10 (1993), 79-85.
2. Unbelievable though it seems, I think that this is what Stump and Kretzmann really
do think. They come close to equating religions with bodies of belief, and wish to define
Christianity as a body of belief (or: doctrine). Thinking that Christianity just is a body of
beliefs seems to me as crazy (and as profoundly unChristian) as thinking that Christianity
just is a set of ritual acts or a set of sacred texts. Christianity, I would rather say, as a first
stab at a corrective (and speaking as a Christian), is present wherever faithful Christians
are present; and Christian faith consists not primarily in assent to a body of belief but
rather in a properly-constituted relation to the triune God (though of course such a relation
requires assent, explicit or implicit, to all kinds of doctrines). This, anyway, is what the
New Testament says. But this is much too large a topic to pursue here.
3. By "sociological" they seem to mean any data arrived at by broadly empirical means,
including the historical; this is an odd usage but for the sake of the discussion I shall adopt
it in what follows, and shall signal my reservations about it by the use of scare-quotes.
4. Though I do not think it clear that the brief sketch given by Stump and Kretzmann
of what they take to be a supersessionist theology of the relation between Judaism and
Christianity that avoids antisemitism does in fact avoid it; neither do I think that what they
say does more than scratch the surface of this very difficult question.

